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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
AMADOR AREVALO,

• ,

PlaintiffAppellant,

]
Case No. 870014-CA

v.

Category No. 6

THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
DefendantRespondent.

;

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Was

plaintiff denied his right to due

process under the Utah and United States Constitutions by
defendant's failure to provide him with actual notice of his
right to appeal?
2.

Was the defendant's decision that plaintiff

failed to establish good cause for filing a late appeal
supported by substantial evidence?
3-

Did the defendant err in refusing to hear

plaintiff's case under its continuing jurisdiction authority?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final decision of the
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, dated December
23, 1986 (R 17), affirming a decision of the Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ).

Plaintiff filed his request for a hearing
2

on August 11, 1986 (R 75-76), for the purpose of contesting
a March 11, 1983 decision by the Department of Employment
Security that he had knowingly withheld material information
concerning his eligibility for unemployment compensation
benefits (UCB). (R 78)

The 1983 decision resulted in the

amount of $6,664 being claimed due and payable (R 78).
Plaintiff's hearing was held on October 28, 1986 where he
was represented by Paralegal Tracy Burgess of Utah Legal
Services, and by the undersigned attorney. (R 44)
Following the receipt of exhibits at the hearing
and the taking of testimony, ALJ Barnes ruled on November 3,
1986 that plaintiff's appeal was not timely within the
requirements of U.C.A. § 3 5-4-6(c) of the Utah Employment
Security Act (R 42-43).

The ALJ concluded, therefore, that

he lacked jurisdiction for further consideration of the
matter.

(R 43)

Plaintiff made a timely request for review

of the hearing decision on November 5, 1986.

(R 41)

Plaintiff's request for review was denied and he filed a
timely petition for a Writ of Review with this court on
January 13, 1987. (R 6-7)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is a thirty-four-year-old individual who
resides with his wife and three children in Layton, Utah.
(R 46) In 1982, plaintiff was employed in the state of Utah
and, following termination from his employinent, applied for
and received unemployment compensation benefits. (R 78)
Plaintiff, who is illiterate in the English language (R 39,

3

46, 66), was advised by defendant on February 9, 1983 of a
possible overpayment. (R 78)

Plaintiff did not respond to

the inquiry since he had left the United States and returned
to Mexico. (R 78)

He resided in Mexico until approximately

June, 1984 when he returned to this country and married his
current wife, who is a United States citizen. (R 56) On the
basis of his marriage to a U.S. citizen, plaintiff was
granted permanent residence status by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). (R 38) I
According to records maintained by defendant, a
Notice of Denial of Benefits was mailed to plaintiff on
March 11, 1983 advising him that he had knowingly withheld
material information to receive benefits.

Plaintiff was

advised in the Notice of his right to a hearing; because of
his absence from the country, he never received the notice
and consequently

did not request a hearing.

Thus, the

March 11, 1983 Notice became a final determination finding
that plaintiff had incurred a fraud overpayment in the
amount of $6,664.

|

Following his marriage, plaintiff again was
employed in the state of Utah.

Sometime during November,

1985, he became separated from employment and applied for
UCB at the Clearfield Job Service office.

Testimony at his

hearing showed that plaintiff was initially determined
eligible for benefits by a Job Service caseworker and was
advised that he would begin receiving weekly benefits. The
caseworker then consulted with Doug Larson, a claims

4

examiner in the Job Service office, who discovered the
outstanding 1983 overpayment.

Plaintiff was then advised

that he was ineligible to receive benefits and would have to
begin repaying the overpaid amount. (R 56-58)"
Uncontradicted testimony by plaintiff and his wife
at the hearing established that plaintiff was never provided
with an actual copy of the March, 1983 decision nor was he
specifically advised of a time deadline for filing a request
for a hearing. (R 56-58)

Moreover, the testimony showed

that the only advice given plaintiff by the

Job Service

office was that he had to pay the claim. (R 56)

Plaintiff

was unfamiliar with his hearing rights and was afraid that
he would be arrested if he did not pay the outstanding
amount. (R 58)

No written notice was given to plaintiff

advising him of any further right to review of the 1983
decision.
In March, 1986, acting upon the advice of a fellow
employee, plaintiff contacted the Ogden office of Utah Legal
Services for legal advice. (R 51)

His case was accepted by

Paralegal Tracy Burgess on March 17, 1986, who began investigating the possible merits of an appeal. (R 62) Ms.
Burgess' testimony showed that she was not aware at that
time of a specific deadline for requesting a hearing and had
handled only one unemployment case prior to that time.
(R 64-65)

Following lengthy review of his case by Ms.

Burgess, a request for hearing was filed on August 11, 1986.
(R 75)

0

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT!
The ALJ's refusal to consider the merits of
plaintiff's case represents a denial of plaintiff's right to
procedural due process.

Plaintiff has several property

interests at stake, including his right to receive future
wages without being subject to garnishment or other collection procedures as well as a right to ongoing unemployment
compensation benefits, when eligible.

The state's refusal

to grant plaintiff a hearing on the merits of his case, its
failure to give him actual notice of the fraud overpayment
decision and its improper advice as to his appeal rights
constitute a deprivation of his right to due process.
The defendant further erred in applying its own
regulations, since substantial evidence shows that plaintiff
never actually received a copy of the decision until the day
of his hearing.

Further, all of the circumstances in

plaintiff's case show that he did not have control over the
timely filing of his appeal.

Finally, the state should have

liberally construed the statute in question and taken
jurisdiction of plaintiff's case under its continuing
jurisdiction authority.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED
SINCE ITS REFUSAL TO GRANT PLAINTIFF A HEARING
DENIED HIM HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE
UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS.
It is a fundamental principle of law that a state
may not deprive a person of a constitutionally protected
6

liberty or property interest without observing the requirements of due process of law.

It is without question in this

case that state action was involved, since the Department of
Employment Security initiated the procedure which resulted
in the March 11, 1983 fraud overpayment.

State action was

also involved in November, 1985 when plaintiff was denied
further unemployment compensation benefits by representatives of the Clearfield Job Service office because of the
outstanding fraud overpayment.

It is this action, and the

inaction of the Clearfield Job Service caseworker and claims
examiner, all of whom are employees of the state of Utah,
that deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally guaranteed
rights.
A constitutionally protected property interest is
present in plaintiff's case.

The state's action in estab-

lishing a fraud overpayment subjects plaintiff to ongoing
financial liability for repayment of a $6,664.00 claim.

Any

future wages which plaintiff earns, and in which he has a
property interest, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349(1969), will be
subject to ongoing collection procedures.

Additionally,

under applicable Utah law, plaintiff remains disqualified
from receiving future UCB until he has repaid the fraud
overpayment.

Thus, plaintiff's entitlement to unemployment

compensation has been and will be denied unless he is
permitted to address the allegation that he willfully
withheld material information resulting in an overpayment.

7

The Utah Supreme Court, like many other appellate
courts, has concluded that a person's right to UCB is a
constitutionally protected property interest. In Gray v.
Department of Employment Security, 681 P.2d 807, 817 (Ut.
1984) the Court noted that although the United States
Supreme Court had never held explicitly that UCB fell within
the definition of a property interest, such benefits were
implicitly encompassed therein.

See Steinberg v. Fusari,

419 US 379, 389, 95 S.Ct. 533, 539, 42 L.Ed.2d 521, .reh'g
denied, 420 U.S. 955, 95 S.Ct. 1340, 43 L.Ed.2d 433 (1975).
The Court cited with approval the decision in Klimko v.
Virginia Employment Commission, 216 Va. 750, 222 S.E.2d 559
(1976) wherein the Virginia Court held that unemployment
compensation benefits "may constitute a property interest
within the protection of the procedural due process guarantees of the Constitution."

Id.-, at 565.

Other cases which support the Utah Court's holding
include Graves v. Meystrik, 425 F.Supp. 40, 47 (E.D. Mo.
1977) which held, in reliance on Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 571-72, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2706, 33 L.Ed.2d 548
(1972) and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262, 90 S.Ct.
1011, 1017, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), that unemployment benefits, like welfare benefits, are a matter of statutory
entitlement and, therefore, are interests which are protected by the procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The court noted a long list of items

found to be property interests including wages and a
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person's good name and reputation. Id., at 47, n. 1

Simi-

larly, in Brewer v. Cantrell, 622 F. Supp. 1320, 1327
(D.C.Va. 1985), the federal court followed the Virginia
Supreme Court's lead in Klimko, supra, and assumed that a
property interest existed in unemployment compensation
benefits.
Once it is established that state action is
involved affecting a property interest, the inquiry must
next focus on what process is due.

A good starting point

for such an inquiry is the decision in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 28 L.Ed.2d 113, 91 S.Ct. 780 (1971)
wherein the Court, in the light of one hundred years of
decisions addressing due process issues, identified two
important principles firmly imbedded in the Court's due
process jurisprudence.

The Court noted:

Prior cases establish, first, that due process requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing
state interest of overriding significance, persons
forced to settle their claims of right and duty through
the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Id., at 377.
The Court stressed that the Constitution requires
a "meaningful opportunity" to be heard.

It further ob-

served:
That the hearing required by due process is subject to
waiver, and is not fixed in form does not affect its
root requirement that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any
significant property interest, except for extraordinary
situations where some valid governmental interest is at
stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after
the event. (Emphasis in the original) Id.., at 378-79

9

The second important due process principle identified by the Court is that a statute or rule may be constitutionally defective as applied.

The Court summarized:

Our cases further establish that a statute or a rule
may be held constitutionally invalid as applied when it
operates to deprive an individual of a protected right
although its general validity as a measure enacted in
the legitimate exercise of state power is beyond
question. Id.., at 379
Decisions by the Utah Supreme Court, and courts in
other jurisdictions, underscore the fundamental relevance of
the points identified by the United States Supreme Court.
The Utah court has described timely and adequate notice and
the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way as "the very
heart of procedural fairness." Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d
1207, 1211 (Ut. 1983)

The Court reviewed several decisions

in sister states which further support the principle that
the central requisite of procedural due process is that a
hearing be prefaced by timely notice which adequately
informs the parties of the specific issues.

<Id.,

at 1213.

See also Pease v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 694 P.2d
613 (Ut. 1984) (workers compensation applicant entitled to
notice of pendency of an action).
The Utah Court, in Nelson v. Jacobsen, supra, also
reflected the United States Supreme Court's holding that due
process is a flexible concept.

The Court observed:

"Due process" is not a technical concept that can be
reduced to a formula with a fixed content unrelated to
time, place, and circumstances. Nelson v. Jacobsen,
supra, at 1213
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The Court cited with approval the holding in Rupp
v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 341 (Ut.1980) which
opined:
[T]he demands of due process rest on the concept of
basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure
appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Hagopian v.
Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 207 (2d Cir. 1972) has well summarized the flexibility required in applying the due process
principle:
In approaching the question of what process is due
before governmental action adversely affecting private
interests may properly be taken, it must be recognized
that due process is not a rigid formula or simple rule
of thumb to be applied undeviatingly to any given set
of facts. On the contrary, it is a flexible concept
which depends upon the balancing of various factors,
including the nature of the private right or interest
that is threatened, the extent to which the proceeding
is adversarial in character, the severity and consequences of any action that might be taken....
The Utah Supreme Court has used similar language
in characterizing due process:
Due process is not a technical conception with a fixed
content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances; it
is flexible and requires such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands. In an analysis of a
procedure an important factor is the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a private interest through the
procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. Worrall v.
Qgden City Fire Department, 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Ut.
1980)
The actions of the state of Utah violated plaintiff 's fundamental right to due process as that concept is
understood and applied in American jurisprudence.

When all

of the relevant facts are considered, it cannot be said that
plaintiff was given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
11

At the time the state of Utah made its initial determination
on March 11, 1983 that plaintiff had incurred an overpayment
based on willful withholding of material information,
plaintiff was not present in this country-

There is no

evidence in the record to indicate that plaintiff ever
received the state's notice of determination of a fraud
overpayment.

In fact, plaintiff's uncontradicted testimony

shows that he had not seen the Notice of Denial of Benefits
until his hearing on October 28, 1986.

Since he did not

receive the March 11, 1983 decision, plaintiff was
effectively denied personal notice of the time limitations
for requesting further review.
In view of the significant property interest
involved, it would be unjustified to argue that the state's
mere mailing of the March 11, 1983 Notice satisfied the
requirements of procedural due process.

The Ohio federal

court in Bennett v. Lopman, 598 F.Supp. 774 (N.D. Oh. 1984)
has addressed the question of what the consequences should
be when an unemployment compensation benefits claimant
receives no notice whatsoever.

The court held that the Ohio

statute, which did not provide a good faith exception to a
thirty day filing deadline for non-receipt of an administrative decision, violated due process.

The court observed

that a statute which ends a claimant's appeal rights thirty
days after mailing of notice can only satisfy due process
standards if there is a conclusive presumption that mailing
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of the decision results in its receipt by the claimant.
Id., at 783. The court further observed:
It is established that in most instances the U.S. mails
can be "reasonably calculated" to notify an individual.
However, there are inevitably going to be instances
when notice is not received, through no fault of either
the party posting the item or the party to whom the
item is addressed. At one time or another, both the
Government [sic] and members of the public will become
victims of the vagaries of this country's postal system
( which has been the subject of anecdotes about letters
being lost and finally arriving albeit years late.)
The government would be draconian to deny an individual
a property right in unemployment benefits, see Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287
(1970), without any consideration for the arbitrariness
of the non-receipt of that notice. This presumption of
receipt upon mailing is at best highly formalistic and
at worst totally unrealistic. Admittedly, in the case
of recipients of unemployment benefits, it may be
difficult for a state agency to determine the actual
current address for the party because of changes in
residence, etc., conditioned by the loss of income.
Nonetheless, a claimant has a right to personal notice.
See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714, 727, 24
L.Ed. 565 (1877). Id., at 783.
In this case, it is beyond dispute that plaintiff
never received personal notice until the day of the hearing
of the state's decision determining that he had fraudulently
incurred an overpayment.

The state's following of its usual

procedure of mailing the notice of decision to the claimant's last known address did not accomplish the purpose of
advising plaintiff that his property interests were in
jeopardy.

Although the state's policy of mailing notice by

regular means may be sufficient in most cases, it is clear
that it was insufficient in this case to provide plaintiff
with personal notice.

For that reason alone it should be

concluded that plaintiff was denied his constitutional right
to due process.
13

Plaintiff's due process rights were further
affected when he appeared at the Clearfield Job Service
office in November, 1985•

At that time, after being ini-

tially advised that he was eligible for current unemployment
compensation benefits, plaintiff was for the first time
advised of the outstanding fraud overpayment.

However,

instead of being personally served with the March 11, 1983
Notice of Denial of Benefits wherein his appeal rights were
contained, the only advice given by the state employees
involved was that plaintiff was required to repay the
overpayment.

Although the state's unemployment compensation

rules provide that within ten days after learning of an
adverse decision, a claimant may request a timely hearing,
there is no evidence in the record that plaintiff ever
received either actual or even constructive notice of his
right to further review.

Given plaintiff's educational and

cultural limitations, it is understandable that he was
incapable of making further inquiry as to his legal rights.
In view of all the circumstances, to leave standing the Board of Review's decision would result in an
unprecedented and unacceptably inflexible application of due
process.

Although the state's rules which permit the late

filing of a hearing request might be sufficient under the
most favorable circumstances to safeguard an affected
person's right to procedural due process, it is clear that
they were markedly insufficient in this case.

It may

properly be concluded that whatever interest the state has

14

in the efficiency of its hearing system is outweighed by the
plaintiff's right to protect himself against an unfair
deprivation of his property interest.

The cost to the

state of giving personal notice to a person in plaintiff's
circumstances is not great.

Had plaintiff been properly

advised in writing on the day he appeared at the Clearfield
Job Service office, it is far more likely that he would have
taken timely action to assert his appeal rights.

Only a

highly technical application of the due process right could
justify the state's action in this case.
The need for proper application of due process is
especially great in this case, since the applicable Utah
statute allows the state to impose the most severe penalty
for the willful withholding of material information. U.C.A.
§ 35-4-5(e)

The statute in question distinguishes between

overpayments based simply on fault and those arising from
fraud.

A fault overpayment must be repaid, but, in the

discretion of the Industrial Commission, the overpaid sum
may be deducted from any future benefits payable to the
claimant. U.C.A. § 35-4-6(d)

In contrast, overpayments

arising from fraud are doubled as a penalty and are collectible by civil action or warrant. U.C.A. § 35-4-5(e)

The

fraud overpayment may not be set off against future amounts
payable.

In addition, the statute provides that a claimant

against whom a fraud overpayment has been assessed is
ineligible for future benefits or waiting week credit if the
amount owed remains unpaid.

15

The requirement of legal notice to those affected
has always been a prerequisite to lawful punitive action.
Wright v. Arkansas Activities Association, 501 F.2d 25, (8th
Cir. 1974)

Further, the United States Supreme Court has

stated:
The "right to be heard before being condemned to suffer
grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not
involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society." Joint
Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 US 123, 168, 95
L.Ed. 817, 71 S.Ct 624 (1951)(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319, 333, 47
L.Ed.2d 18, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976).
Sanctions are not to be assessed lightly or
without fair notice and there must be sufficient opportunity
for the party subject to the sanction to demonstrate that
his conduct was not undertaken recklessly or willfully.
F.T.C. v. Alaska Land Leasing, Inc., 799 F.2d 507, 510 (9th
Cir. 1986)
The penalty which the state seeks to impose on the
plaintiff in the form of a fraud overpayment is highly
punitive in nature.

If the need for constitutional protec-

tions can be measured in terms of the seriousness of the
potential harm, then plaintiff has the highest need for due
process protection.

Plaintiff stands to suffer a grievous

loss unless the court acts to assure his constitutional
right to be heard.
Inherent in the concept of due process is the
American ideal of fairness in the treatment of all.

Howard

v. United States, 372 F.2d 294, 301 (9th Cir. 1967)

If

fundamental fairness is the test of due process, Watson v.
16

Patterson, 358 F.2d 297, 298 (10th Cir. 1966), then it must
be concluded that the state has failed in this case. The
denial of a hearing to a low income, illiterate claimant who
was never been given actual notice of his hearing rights and
who faces the most severe penalty available under the
Employment Security Act patently offends the American ideal
of fairness.

That ideal can only have real meaning if the

most vulnerable individuals, such as the plaintiff herein,
are accorded the due process required by the Utah and United
States Constitutions.
POINT II
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW SHOULD
BE REVERSED SINCE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
IS LACKING FOR ITS DECISION THAT PLAINTIFF
LACKED GOOD CAUSE TO MAKE A LATE APPEAL.
The ALJ in his Reasoning and Conclusions of Law
applied U.C.A. § 35-4-6(c) which provides:
f,

The claimant or any other party entitled to
notice of a determination as herein provided may
file an appeal from such determination with an
appeal referee within ten days after the date of
mailing of the notice to his last known address
or, if such notice is not mailed, within ten days
after the date of delivery of such notice.(R 43)
The ALJ then considered the rules adopted by the
Department of Employment Security for determining good cause
for a late appeal. (Appendix A)

The grounds for establish-

ing good cause are stated in the disjunctive and provide, in
part:
A late appeal may be considered on its merits if it is
determined that the appeal was delayed for good cause.
Good cause is limited to circumstances where it is
shown that:
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1.

The appeal was filed within ten days of actual
receipt of the decision if such receipt was beyond
the original appeal period and not the result of
willful neglect; Department of Employment Security Rules § A71-07-l:6 H.

The ALJ erred, first of all, since the claimant's
uncontradicted testimony showed that he had not received an
actual copy of the March 11, 1983 decision until the date of
the hearing on October 28, 1986. (R 49) Although the
testimony showed that plaintiff was orally advised by
Clearfield Job Service workers in November, 1985 of the
outstanding fraud overpayment, there is no evidence that he
was personally served with a copy of the decision at that
time.

On this ground alone, the ALJ should have granted

plaintiff's late appeal.
The remaining two grounds for filing a late appeal
are equally applicable in plaintiff's case.

They provide:

2. The delay in filing the appeal was due to circumstances beyond the control of the appellant; or
3.
The appellant delayed filing the appeal for
circumstances which were compelling and reasonable.
Department of Employment Security Rules § A71-07-l:6 H
The facts established show that plaintiff's case
meets these criteria.

Plaintiff cannot be said to have had

control of his decision to file an appeal when in November,
1985 he was not given an actual copy of the decision, was
not advised of his appeal rights by Clearfield Job Service
workers and, in fact, was told that all he could do was pay
off the judgment.

Given plaintiff's unfamiliarity with the

unemployment compensation system, it is not unreasonable
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that he did not take any action until a co-worker advised
him in March, 1986 to contact Utah Legal Services. Although
the actual filing of the request for a hearing was further
delayed by his paralegal representative, the plaintiff again
had no control over his representativefs handling of the
case.

His representative's delay in requesting a hearing,

for whatever reason, should have no effect on the establishment of good cause. Trujillo v. Industrial Commission, 648
P.2d 1094, 1096 (Colo.App. 1982) When the facts of plaintiff's case are viewed in their entirety, it may properly be
concluded that his delay was due to circumstances beyond his
control or for circumstances which were compelling and
reasonable.

For this further reason, the Board of Review's

decision should be reversed.
POINT III
THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S DECISION SHOULD BE
REVERSED SINCE IT FAILED TO TAKE JURISDICTION OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE UNDER ITS
UNLIMITED JURISDICTION AUTHORITY.
The Utah Code provides that defendant has unlimited jurisdiction over fraud determinations.
35-4-6(b)

U.C.A. §

That section provides, in part:

Jurisdiction over benefits shall be continuous. Upon
its own initiative or upon application of any party
affected, the commission or its authorized representatives may on the basis of change in conditions or
because of a mistake as to facts, review a decision
allowing or disallowing in whole or in part a claim for
benefits....
No review shall be made after one year from the date of
the original determination except in cases of fraud, or
claimant fault, as provided in subsection (d) of this
section.
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The rule adopted by the Department of Employment
Security implementing this section of the Code provides:
There is no time limitation on exercising jurisdiction
if there was fraud or a [sic] overpayment as the result
of fault by the claimant. There must be an overpayment
which is charged to the claimant in accordance with
provisions of Section 35-4-6(d) before jurisdiction can
be taken beyond one year after the original determination. Department of Employment Security Rules §
A71-07-l:6 (II)C (Appendix B)
The aforecited authority was a sufficient basis
for the state of Utah to have taken jurisdiction in plaintiff's case.

In view of the circumstances discussed limit-

ing plaintiff's ability to exercise his appeal rights,
including the denial of due process, the state erred in
failing to exercise jurisdiction.

Case law has established

that unemployment compensation statutes are to be construed
liberally in favor of the claimant when possible.

Superior

Cablevision Installers, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 6 83
P.2d 444 (Ut. 1984);

Trujillo v. Industrial Commission,

supra, at 1096. Application.of that principle in this case
should have been sufficient for the ALJ to permit plaintiff
to address the merits of the issues raised in his case.
CONCLUSION
The ALJ's refusal to consider the merits of
plaintiff's case represents a denial of plaintiff's right to
procedural due process.

Plaintiff has several property

interests at stake, including his right to receive future
wages without being subject to garnishment^or other collection procedures as well as a right to ongoing unemployment
compensation benefits, when eligible.
20

The state's refusal

to grant plaintiff a hearing on the merits of his case, its
failure to give him actual notice of the fraud overpayment
decision and its improper advice as to his appeal rights
constitute a deprivation of his right to due process.
The defendant further erred in applying its own
regulations, since substantial evidence shows that plaintiff
never actually received a copy of the decision until the day
of his hearing.

Further, all of the circumstances in

plaintiff's case show that he did not have control over the
timely filing of his appeal.

Finally, the state should have

liberally construed the statute in question and taken
jurisdiction of plaintiff's case under its continuing
jurisdiction authority.

For all these reasons, the decision

of the Board of Review should be reversed and plaintiff
permitted to address the merits of his case.
DATED this *D<5^

day of /UyJir

, 1987.

Respectfully submitted,

Michael E. Bulson
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I have mailed four true and
correct copies of the above BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the
Attornies for Defendant: DAVID L. WILKINSON, Attorney
General of Utah, at State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114, and LINDA WHEAT FIELD, Special Assistant
Attorney General, Department of Employment Security, at 123 4
South Main Street, P. 0, Box 11600, Salt Lake City, Utah
84147, via first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this
rOZT day of April, 1986.
Michael E. Bulson
Attorney for Plaintiff
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A71-07-l:6

(III)

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY —

RULES AND REGULATIONS

PROVISIONS FOR FILING AN APPEAL
Section 35-4-6(c) The claimant or any other party entitled
to notice of a determination as herein provided may file an
appeal from such determination with an appeal referee within ten days after the date of mailing of the notice to his
last known address or, if such notice is not mailed, within ten days days after the date of delivery of such notice.
APPEAL NOTICE
Unless the appeal or referral is withdrawn with his permission, the appeal referee, after affording the parties
reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing, shall make findings and conclusions on the basis thereof affirm, modify,
or reverse such determination; provided, the referee shall
give notice of the pendence of an appeal to the commission,
which may thenceforth be a party to the proceedings.
COPY OF DECISION
The parties shall be promptly notified of such referee's
decision and shall be furnished with a copy of the decision
and the findings and conclusions in support thereof and
such decision shall be deemed to be final unless, within
ten days after the date of mailing of notice thereof to the
party's last known addres, or in the absence of such mailings, within ten days after the delivery of such notice,
further appeal is initiated pursuant to the provisions of
section 35-4-10.

A.

GENERAL DEFINITION

This provision of the act provides the opportunity for any parties affected by
decisions made by the Department to file an appeal. The time limitations for
filing appeals, which includes protests, requests for hearings, petitions and
other requests or applications, and the exceptions to those time limitations are
explained herein. This section also provides provisions for withdrawing appeals,
explains the opportunities which must be provided to parties to assure a fair
hearing; identifies the commission as a party to the hearing; specifies the
requirements of notification of the referee's decision; and explains the further
rights of appeal.
V

B . "ISSUANCE OF DETERMINATIONS
A notice of determination is not considered to have been issued unless it is
sent through the U.S. mail or served in person.
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C.

APPEAL TIME LIMITATION FOR DECISIONS THAT ARE NOT MAILED

If a decision issued by the Department is personally given to a party rather than
sent through the mail, the amount of time permitted for an appeal is ten calendar
days unless otherwise specified on the decision or by the Act.
D.

APPEAL TIME LIMITATION FOR DECISIONS WHICH ARE MAILED

If a decision issued by the Department is mailed, three days are added to the
time prescribed by the Act for filing the appeal. Therefore, the amount of time
permitted for filing an appeal from any decision that is mailed by the Department
is thirteen calendar days unless otherwise specified on the decision or by the
Act.
E." COMPUTATION OF TIME LIMITATIONS
In computing the period of time allowed by the Act for filing appeals under
this section, the day the decision is mailed or handed to a party is not to be
included. The last day of the appeal period that follows is to be included in
the computation unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday when the offices
of the Department are closed. If the last day permitted for filing an appeal
falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, the time permitted for filing a
timely appeal will be extended to the next day when the offices of the Department
are open.
F.

DATE OF RECEIPT

Any appeal which has been sent through the U.S. mail is considered filed and
received by the Department on the date shown by the post office cancellation
mark. When the post mark date cannot be established because it is illegible,
erroneous or omitted, the appeal will be considered filed on the date it was
mailed if the sender establishes that date by competent evidence and can show
that it was mailed prior to the date of actual receipt. If the date of mailing
cannot be established by competent evidence, the document will be considered
filed on the date it is actually received by the Department as shown by the
Department's date stamp on the document or other credible evidence such as a
written notation of the date of receipt.
G.

LIMITATION OF JURISDICTION

When i t appears that an appeal may not have been f i l e d w i t h i n the time allowed
by the Act or these Rules, the appellant w i l l be n o t i f i e d and given an opportunity
to show that the appeal was timely or was delayed for good cause. I f i t is found
that the appeal was riot f i l e d within the applicable time l i m i t and the delay was
without good cause, the Administrative Law Judge w i l l not have j u r i s d i c t i o n to
consider the merits unless j u r i s d i c t i o n i s established in accordance with
provisions of Section 35-4-6(b) of the Act. Any decision w i t h regard to j u r i s d i c tional issues w i l l be issued in w r i t i n g and given or mailed to a l l interested
parties with a clear statement of the r i g h t of further appeal or j u d i c i a l review.
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H.

GOOD CAUSE FOR NOT FILING WITHIN TIME LIMITATIONS

A late appeal may be considered on its merits if it is determined that the appeal
was delayed for good cause• Good cause is limited to circumstances where it is
shown that:
1. The appeal was filed within 10 days of actual receipt of the decision if
such receipt was beyond the original appeal period and not the result of willful
neglect; or
2. The delay in filing the appeal was due to circumstances beyond the control
of the appellant; or
3. The appellant delayed
compelling and reasonable.
I.

filing the appeal

for circumstances which

were

PROCEDURE FOR FILING AN APPEAL

An appeal must be filed in writing by mailing a signed letter to the mailing
address of the Appeals Tribunal as shown on the notice of decision, or submitting
a written statement at a Job Service office in Utah or in the state in which the
appellant resides. The appeal must be signed by an interested party who has a
right to notice of a determination unless it can be shown that the interested
party has conveyed in writing the authority to another person to act in his
behalf, or he is physically or mentally incapable of acting in his own behalf.
The statement of appeal should give the date and issue of the decision being
appealed, the social security number of any claimant involved, the employer number
or case number of the decision, a statement of the intent of the appeal and the
facts or reasons which support the request. However, the failure of an appellant
to include such information will not preclude the acceptance of an appeal. The
scope of review will not be limited to the issues or contentions stated in the
appeal. If the Department has begun payment of benefits to a claimant, such
payments will not be discontinued pending the outcome of an appeal even if the
claimant is willing to waive his right to payment. However, if benefits are
denied as a result of the appeal an overpayment may be established in accordance
with provisions of either Section 35-4-6(d) or 35-4~6(e) of the Act.
J.

REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR FAIR HEARING
1.

Notice

a. All interested parties will be notified by mail at least seven days
prior to the hearing pf:
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(1)

The time and place, or conditions of the hearing,

(2)

The legal issues,

(3)

The consequences of not appearing, and
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(4)

The

procedures

and

limitations

for

requesting

rescheduling.

b. When a new issue arises during the hearing or under other unusual
circumstances, advance written notice may be waived by the parties after a full
verbal explanation of the issues and potential results.
c. It is the responsibility of the parties to a hearing to notify any
representatives or witnesses of the time and place of the hearing and to make
necessary arrangements for their participation.
d. If a party has designated a person or professional organization as
his agent, notice of hearings will be sent to that agent and when such notice is
sent, it will be considered that the party has been given notice.
e. If an interpreter is needed by any parties or their witnesses, the
party should arrange for an interpreter who is an adult with fluent ability to
understand and speak english and the language of the person testifying, or notify
the Appeals Office at the time the appeal is filed, (or when notification is
given that an appeal has been filed), that assistance is required in arranging
for an interpreter.
2.

Hearing of Appeal

a. All hearings will be conducted informally and in such manner as to
protect the rights of the parties. All issues relevant to the appeal will be
considered and passed upon. The decision of the Appeals Referee, hereafter
referred to as Administrative Law Judge, will be based solely on the testimony
and evidence presented at the hearing.
b. All testimony of witnesses will be given under oath. Any party to an
appeal will be given an adequate opportunity to be heard and present any pertinent
evidence of probative value and to know and rebut by cross-examination or otherwise
any other evidence submitted. The Administrative Law Judge will direct the order
of testimony and rule on the admissibility of evidence. Oral or written evidence
of any nature, whether or not conforming to the legal rules of evidence, may be
accepted and will be given its proper weight. However, no finding of fact will
be based solely on contested hearsay. Any official records of the Department,
including reports submitted in connection with the administration of the Employment Security Act may be included in the record. The Administrative Law Judge
may take such additional evidence as is deemed necessary.
c. The parties to an appeal, with consent of the Administrative
Judge, may stipulate to the facts involved. The Administrative Law Judge
decide the appeal on the basis of such facts, or in his discretion, may
the appeal for hearing and take such further evidence as deemed necessary
determine the appeal.
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d. The Administrative Law Judge may require portions of the evidence to
be transcribed as necessary for rendering a decision.
K.

RESCHEDULING AND ADJOURNMENT OF HEARINGS

1 . The Administrative Law Judge may, at his d i s c r e t i o n , adjourn or continue
a hearing on his own motion.
2.

Prior to the Hearing

A hearing before an Administrative Law Judge may be rescheduled or postponed for
reasonable cause if the request is made to the Administrative Law Judge orally
or in writing before the hearing is concluded. Such a request may be made by
any interested party, however, more than one continuance will not normally be
granted if it adversely impacts on the other parties rights to benefits or potential liability for benefit costs. Reasonable cause may not be established solely
because of such things as:
a. Conflicting personal or business plans or appointments
parties or their witnesses that could reasonably be rearranged,
b. Failure to make
subpoenaes of witnesses,

timely

arrangements

c. Failure to arrange for legal counsel
for the hearing,

for witnesses

or to request

in sufficient time to prepare

d. Failure to obtain pertinent documents which
been obtained prior to the hearing,
e.

of the

could

reasonably have

Lack of preparation.

3. If one of the parties fails to appear at the hearing, the Administrative
Law Judge will, unless there is good cause for continuance, issue a decision
based on the available evidence.
4.

After the Hearing

Any party who fails to participate personally or by authorized representative at
a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge may, within seven days after the
scheduled date of the hearing, make a written request for reopening of the hearing.
Such petition will be granted if good cause is shown for failing to participate.
A request for reopening made after the scheduled hearing must be in writing; it
must state the reason(s) believed to constitute good cause for failing to participate at the hearing; and it must be delivered or mailed within a seven day period
to the Appeals office or to an office of the Department of Employment Security or
to a Job Service office in any state.1 If the request for reopening is not filed
within seven days, reopening will not1 be granted unless the party can show good
cause for failing to make the request within the seven day time limitation. If
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a request for reopening is not allowed, a copy of the decision will be given or
mailed to each party, with a clear statement of the right of appeal or judicial
review. If a request for reopening is made, a hearing will be scheduled and
notice will be given or mailed to each party to the appeal, to determine if there
is good cause for reopening the hearing.
a. Failure to report as instructed at the time and place of the scheduled
hearing is the equalivant of failing to participate even if the party reports at
another time or place. In such circumstances, the party must make a written
request for rescheduling and show good cause in accordance with these Rules
before the matter will be rescheduled.
b. Good cause for failing to participate in an appeal hearing may not
include such things as:
(1)

Failure to read and follow instructions on the notice of hearing,

(2) Failure to arrange personal circumstances such as transportation
or childcare,
(3)

Failure to arrange for receipt or distribution of mail,

(4) Failure
hearing,

to deligate

responsibility

for participation

in the

(5) Forgetfulness.
c. In the event that an appeal has been taken or an application for
review has been made to the Board of Review before the request for reopening is
filed, such request will be referred to the Board of Review.
L.

WITHDRAWAL OF APPEAL

Any party who has filed an appeal from a decision of the Department may request
withdrawal of the appeal by making a request to an Administrative Law Judge,
explaining the reasons for the withdrawal. The Administrative Law Judge may
deny such a request if the withdrawal of the appeal could result in a disservice
to any of the parties, including the Commission.
M.

COMMISSION A PARTY TO PROCEEDINGS

The Department is the authorized agent of the commission. The Act requires that
the commission be given notice of the pendancy of an appeal and that the commission will be a party to the proceedings. Unless the Department designates a
representative who is authorized to represent the Department in appeals, notification of appeals will be sent to the local office which rendered the initial
determination. As a party to the hearing the Department or its representatives
have all the rights and responsibilities of other interested parties to present
evidence, bring witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, give rebuttal evidence, and
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appeal decisions of the Administrative Law Judge. Where the burden of proof is
with the Department, the failure of the Department to meet that burden may result
in an unfavorable ruling for the Department. The Administrative Law Judge cannot
act as the agent for the Department, and therefore is limited to including in
the record only that evidence which is in the Deparment files or submitted by
Department representatives.
Witnesses for the Department may be called on
the motion of the Administrative Law Judge when the need for such testimony is
necessary to clarify rather than impeach the testimony or evidence presented by
the other parties, or the need for such witnesses or evidence could not have
been anticipated by the Department prior to the hearing.
N.

PROMPT NOTIFICATION OF DECISION

All decisions by Administrative Law Judges which effect the rights of any party
with regard to benefits, tax liability, or jurisdictional issues will be issued
(mailed to the last known address of the parties or delivered in person) in writing
with a complete statement of the findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of
law. Each appeal decision which is sent to the parties will include or be accompanied by a notice specifying the further appeal rights of the parties. The notice
of appeal rights shall state clearly the place and manner for taking an appeal
from the decision and the period within which an appeal may be taken.
0.

FINALITY OF DECISION

Decisions of the Administrative Law Judge are binding on all parties and are the
final decision of the commission as provided by Section 35-4-10(f) unless appealed
within ten days of mailing or delivery of the decision.
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(II)

CONTINUING JURISDICTION
Section 35-4-6(b) Jurisdiction over benefits shall be continuous.
Upon its own iniative or upon application of any
party affected, the commission or its authorized representatives may on the basis of change in conditions or because
of a mistake as to facts, review a decision allowing or
disallowing in whole or in part a claim for benefits. Such
review shall be conducted in accordance with such regulations as the commission may prescribe and result in a new
decision which may award, terminate, continue, increase, or
decrease such benefits, or may result in a referral of such
claim to an appeal tribunal.
Notice of any such redetermination shall be promptly given to the party applying for
redetermination and to other parties entitled to notice of
the original determination, in the manner prescribed in
this section with respect to notice of an original determination. Such new order shall be subject to review and an
appeal as provided in this section.
No review shall be
made after one year from the date of the original determination except in cases of fraud, or claimant fault, as provided in subsection (d) of this section.

A.

GENERAL DEFINITION

This section of the Act specifies the conditions under which the Department, as
the agent of the commission, has the authority to reconsider decisions made
with regard to claims for benefits after they have become final. A decision is
not final until the time permitted for the filing of an appeal has elapsed.
There are no limitations on the review of decisions during the appeal period.
Section 35-4-10(f) states that decisions made by the Department are final and
conclusive for all purposes affecting the commission, the claimant and all employing units that had notice of the determination unless it is appealed by one of
the parties, or jurisdiction is established under one of the provisions of Section
35-4-6(b). This regulation establishes the guidelines for the Department's
exercise of discretion in reviewing decisions.
B.

LIMITED JURISDICTION

The Department has np jurisdiction to review or reconsider final decisions
with regard to benefits beyond one year from the date of the decision unless
the claimant was at fault in creation of an overpayment. Jurisdiction may be
taken for up to one year after the original determination was made provided
there was either: 1. a change in conditions, or 2. a mistake as to facts.
When a decision is made on an issue, the date shown by the Department Representative on the notice provided to the parties or the date the decision is recorded
in the Department's records is the date of the decision. If a decision was not
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made, the date the Department was on notice of an issue but failed to act is the
date of the decision.
1.

Change of Conditions

A change of conditions may include^ but is not limited to^_ a change in the law
which would make a reconsideration necessary in fairness to the parties who were
adversely affected by a law change* A change in conditions may also include
personal circumstances of the claimant or employer which would have made it
reasonable not to file an appeal, provided those circumstances have subsequently
and unforeseeably changed.
2.

Mistake as to Facts

A mistake as to facts is limited to material information which was the basis for
the decision. A mistake as to facts may include information which is misunderstood or misinterpreted, but does not include an error in the application of the
Act or the Rules provided the decision is made under the correct section of the
Act. A "mistake" is inadvertent rather than wrong information intentionally
provided by the party subsequently alleging the mistake.
C.

UNLIMITED JURISDICTION

There is no time limitation on exercising jurisdiction if there was fraud or a
overpayment as the result of fault by the claimant. There must be an overpayment
which is charged to the claimant in accordance with provisions of Section 35-4-6(d)
before jurisdiction can be taken beyond one year after the original determination.
D.

DISCRETION

The statute does not require the Department to take jurisdiction in all cases
where there is a change in conditions or a mistake as to facts; the statute
merely permits the Department to take jurisdiction. The claimant and employer
may request a, reconsideration of a decision, but they cannot compel the Department to exercise continuing jurisdiction. The Department will exercise continuing
jurisdiction if it is necessary in fairness to an interested party who did not
have access to material information or could not reasonably have filed an appeal
provided there was a mistake as to facts or a change in conditions.
However,
jurisdiction may not be taken if the redetermination would have little or no
effect. The Department will weigh the administrative burden of making a redetermination against the requirements of fairness and the opportunities of the
parties affected to file an appeal. Jurisdiction will be taken in all cases
where the Department is aware of a claimant fault overpayment which is large
enough to be "set up" as provided by the Rules pertaining to Section 35-4-6 (d).
E.

OBLIGATION OF DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES

Employees of the Department are obligated, regardless of when the information is
discovered, to bring to the attention of the proper Department representatives
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any information that may a f f e c t an i n d i v i d u a l ' s e l i g i b i l i t y for unemployment
insurance benefits or information a f f e c t i n g the employer's c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,
F.

NOTICE

Any time a decision is reconsidered all interested parties will be notified of
the new information and provided an opportunity to attend hearings held in
conjunction with the review. All interested parties will receive notification
of the redetermination and given the right to appeal.
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